Innovation in banking and excessive loan growth /
prepared by Daniel C. Hardy and Alexander F. Tieman.
Description
- Language(s)
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English
- Published
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Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Dept., 2008.
- Summary
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The volume of credit extended by a bank can be an informative signal of its abilities in loan selection and management. It is shown that, under asymmetric information, banks may therefore rationally lend more than they would otherwise in order to demonstrate their quality, thus negatively affecting financial system soundness. Small shifts in technology and uncertainty associated with new technology may lead to large jumps in equilibrium outcomes. Prudential measures and supervision are therefore warranted.
- Note
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"July 2008."
Also available on the World Wide Web.
- Physical Description
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28 p. :
ill. ;
28 cm.
Viewability