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‡aHG3881.5.I58
‡bW67 no.08/188
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‡aHardy, Daniel C. L.
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245 |
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‡aInnovation in banking and excessive loan growth /
‡cprepared by Daniel C. Hardy and Alexander F. Tieman.
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‡aWashington, D.C. :
‡bInternational Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Dept.,
‡c2008.
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300 |
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‡a28 p. :
‡bill. ;
‡c28 cm.
|
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‡aIMF working paper ;
‡vWP/08/188
|
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‡a"July 2008."
|
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‡aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 25-26).
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520 |
3 |
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‡aThe volume of credit extended by a bank can be an informative signal of its abilities in loan selection and management. It is shown that, under asymmetric information, banks may therefore rationally lend more than they would otherwise in order to demonstrate their quality, thus negatively affecting financial system soundness. Small shifts in technology and uncertainty associated with new technology may lead to large jumps in equilibrium outcomes. Prudential measures and supervision are therefore warranted.
|
530 |
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‡aAlso available on the World Wide Web.
|
538 |
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‡aMode of access: Internet.
|
650 |
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‡aBank loans
‡xEconometric models.
|
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‡aTieman, Alexander F.
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‡aInternational Monetary Fund.
‡bMonetary and Capital Markets Dept.
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