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| 100 | 1 | ⊔ | ‡aCarlton, Dennis W. |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | ‡aModern industrial organization / ‡cDennis W. Carlton, Jeffrey M. Perloff. |
| 250 | ⊔ | ⊔ | ‡a4th ed. |
| 260 | ⊔ | ⊔ | ‡aBoston : ‡bPearson/Addison Wesley, ‡c©2005. |
| 300 | ⊔ | ⊔ | ‡axxiii, 822 pages : ‡billustrations ; ‡c24 cm |
| 336 | ⊔ | ⊔ | ‡atext ‡btxt ‡2rdacontent |
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| 338 | ⊔ | ⊔ | ‡avolume ‡bnc ‡2rdacarrier |
| 490 | 0 | ⊔ | ‡aThe Addison-Wesley series in economics |
| 504 | ⊔ | ⊔ | ‡aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 737-779) and index. |
| 505 | 0 | 0 | ‡gChapter 15. -- ‡tDecision Making Over Time: Durability -- ‡tHow Long Should a Durable Good Last? -- ‡tCompetitive Firm's Choice of Durability -- ‡tThe Monopoly's Choice of Durability -- ‡tCostly Installation and Maintenance -- ‡tRenting Versus Selling by a Monopoly -- ‡tResale Market -- ‡t*Consumers' Expectations Constrain the Monopoly -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tSuggested Readings -- ‡tAppendix 15A -- ‡tMultiperiod Durable Goods Monopoly -- ‡tExample 15.1 -- ‡tUnited Shoe -- ‡tExample 15.2 -- ‡tThe Importance of Used Goods -- ‡tExample 15.3 -- ‡tThe Alcoa Case: Secondhand Economics -- ‡tExample 15.4 -- ‡tLeasing Under Adverse Selection -- ‡tExample 15.5 -- ‡tSales versus Rentals -- ‡tExample 15.6 -- ‡tLowering the Resale Price of Used Textbooks -- ‡gChapter 16. -- ‡tPatents and Technological Change -- ‡tPatents, Copyrights, and Trademarks -- ‡tPatents -- ‡tCopyrights -- ‡tTrademarks -- ‡tDistinctions Between Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks -- ‡tIncentives for Inventions are Needed -- ‡tImitation Discourages Research -- ‡tPatents Encourage Research -- ‡tPatents Encourage Disclosure -- ‡t*Patents, Prizes, Research Contracts, and Joint Ventures -- ‡tDetermining the Optimal Number of Firms -- ‡tNo Government Incentives -- ‡tGovernment-Financed Research -- ‡tPrizes -- ‡tRelaxing Antitrust Laws: Joint Ventures -- ‡tPatents -- ‡tGovernment Uncertainty -- ‡tPatent Holders May Manufacture or License -- ‡tEliminating Patents -- ‡tMarket Structure -- ‡tMarket Structure Without a Patent Race -- ‡tOptimal Timing of Innovations -- ‡tMonopolies in Patent Races -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tSuggested Readings -- ‡tExample 16.1 -- ‡tPiracy -- ‡tExample 16.2 -- ‡tPatents Versus Secrets -- ‡tExample 16.3 -- ‡tMonkey see, Monkey Do -- ‡tExample 16.4 -- ‡tJoint Public-Private R & D -- ‡tExample 16.5 -- ‡tPrizes -- ‡tExample 16.6 -- ‡tMickey Mouse Legislative -- ‡tExample 16.7 -- ‡tEuropean Patents -- ‡tExample 16.8 -- ‡tPatent, Thicket -- ‡gChapter 17. -- ‡tHow Markets Clear: Theory and Facts -- ‡tHow Markets Clear: Three Simple Theories -- ‡tCompetition -- ‡tOligopoly Models -- ‡tMonopoly -- ‡tEmpirical Evidence on the Role of Price in Allocating Goods -- ‡tThe Rigidity of Prices -- ‡tMovements in Prices and Price-Cost Margins over the Business Cycle -- ‡tExplaining the Evidence -- ‡tExtensions to the Simple Theory: The Introduction of Time -- ‡tFixed Costs of Changing Price -- ‡tImplications of an Unchanging Price for Inventories -- ‡tAsymmetric Information and Moral Hazard -- ‡tToward a General Theory of Allocation -- ‡tMarket Structure is More Than Concentration -- ‡tProduce-to-Order Versus Produce-to-Stock -- ‡tTransmission of Shocks in Industries with Fixed Prices -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tExample 17.1 -- ‡tPrice Rigidity: It's the Real Thing -- ‡tExample 17.2 -- ‡tHow Much Is That Turkey in the Window? -- ‡tExample 17.3 -- ‡tThe Cost of Changing Prices -- ‡tExample 17.4 -- ‡tCreating Futures Markets -- ‡gPart 6 -- ‡tGovernment Policies and Their Effects -- ‡gChapter 18. -- ‡tInternational Trade -- ‡tReasons for Trade Between Countries -- ‡tComparative Advantage -- ‡tIntra-Industry Trade in Differentiated Products -- ‡tFree Riding, International Price Differences, and Gray Markets -- ‡tDumping -- ‡tTariffs, Subsidies, and Quotas -- ‡tCompetition -- ‡tCreating and Battling Monopolies -- ‡tStrategic Trade Policy -- ‡tIndustries with Positive Externalities -- ‡tEmpirical Evidence on Intervention in International Trade -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tAppendix 18A -- ‡tDerivation of the Optimal Subsidy -- ‡tExample 18.1 -- ‡tGray Markets -- ‡tExample 18.2 -- ‡tTimber Wars and Retaliation -- ‡tExample 18.3 -- ‡tForeign Doctors -- ‡tExample 18.4 -- ‡tBeing Taken for a Ride: Japanese Cars -- ‡tExample 18.5 -- ‡tWide-Body Aircraft -- ‡tExample 18.6 -- ‡tSteeling from U.S. Customers -- ‡gChapter 19. -- ‡tAntitrust Laws and Policy -- ‡tThe Antitrust Laws and Their Purposes -- ‡tAntitrust Statutes -- ‡tEnforcement -- ‡tGoals of the Antitrust Laws -- ‡tWho May Sue? -- ‡tEconomic Theory of Damages -- ‡tThe Use of U.S. Antitrust Laws -- ‡tPrivate Litigation -- ‡tMarket Power and the Definition of Markets -- ‡tMarket Power -- ‡tMarket Definition -- ‡tCooperation Among Competitors -- ‡tPrice-Fixing and Output Agreements -- ‡tNot All Agreements Among Competitors Are Illegal -- ‡tInformation Exchanges Among Competitors -- ‡tOligopoly Behavior -- ‡tMergers -- ‡tExclusionary Actions and Other Strategic Behavior -- ‡tCompetition Between Rivals -- ‡tCompetitive Behavior Deemed Undesirable by the Court -- ‡tVertical Arrangements Between Firms -- ‡tPrice Discrimination -- ‡tPrice Discrimination Under Robinson-Patman -- ‡tTie-in Sales -- ‡tEffects of Antitrust Laws on the Organization of Firms -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tSuggested Readings -- ‡tExample 19.1 -- ‡tUsing the Government to Create Market Power: Misuse of the Orange Book -- ‡tExample 19.2 -- ‡tConflict Between European an U.S. Antitrust Authorities: GE-Hneywell -- ‡tExample 19.3 -- ‡tThe Merger Guidelines -- ‡tExample 19.4 -- ‡tAntitrust Laws in Other Countries -- ‡tExample 19.5 -- ‡tColleges and Antitrust: Does Your School Belong to a Cartel? -- ‡tExample 19.6 -- ‡tThe FTC Plays with Toys '' Us -- ‡gChapter 20. -- ‡tRegulation and Deregulation -- ‡tThe Objectives of Regulators -- ‡tMarket Inefficiencies -- ‡tCorrecting Market Inefficiencies -- ‡tCapture Theory and Interest-Group Theory -- ‡tMaking Monopolies More Competitive -- ‡tGovernment Ownership -- ‡tPrivatizing -- ‡tFranchise Bidding -- ‡tPrice Controls -- ‡t*Rate-of-Return Regulation -- ‡tQuality Effects -- ‡tMaking Competitive Industries More Monopolistic -- ‡tLimiting Entry -- ‡tAgricultural Regulations: Price Supports and Quantity Controls -- ‡tDeregulation -- ‡tAirlines -- ‡tGround Transportation -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tSuggested Readings -- ‡tExample 20.1 -- ‡tPizza Protection -- ‡tExample 20.2 -- ‡tCross-Subsidization -- ‡tExample 20.3 -- ‡tLegal Monopolies -- ‡tExample 20.4 -- ‡tPublic, Monopolistic, and Competitive Refuse Collection -- ‡tExample 20.5 -- ‡tRent Control -- ‡tExample 20.6 -- ‡tBrewing Trouble -- ‡tExample 20.7 -- ‡tDeregulating Electricity: California in Shock -- ‡tExample 20.8 -- ‡tInternational and U.S. Deregulation in Telecommunications -- ‡tExample 20.9 -- ‡tEuropean Deregulation of Airlines. |
| 505 | 0 | 0 | ‡gChapter 10. -- ‡tAdvanced Topics in Pricing -- ‡tNonlinear Pricing -- ‡tA Single Two-Part Tariff -- ‡tTwo Two-Part Tariffs -- ‡tTie-in Sales -- ‡tGeneral Justifications for Tie-in Sales -- ‡tTie-in Sales as a Method of Price Discrimination -- ‡tPackage Tie-in Sales of Independent Products -- ‡tInterrelated Demands -- ‡tQuality Choice -- ‡tOther Methods of Nonlinear Pricing -- ‡tMinimum Quantities and Quantity Discounts -- ‡tSelection of Price Schedules -- ‡tPremium for Priority -- ‡tAuctions -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tAppendix 10A -- ‡tThe Optimal Two-Part Tariff -- ‡tAppendix 10B -- ‡tNonlinear Pricing with an Example -- ‡tExample 10.1 -- ‡tFootball Tariffs -- ‡tExample 10.2 -- ‡tYou Auto Save from Tie-in Sales -- ‡tExample 10.3 -- ‡tStuck Holding the Bag -- ‡tExample 10.4 -- ‡tTied to TV -- ‡tExample 10.5 -- ‡tNot Too Suite-Mixed Bundling -- ‡tExample 10.6 -- ‡tPrice Discriminating on eBay -- ‡gChapter 11. -- ‡tStrategic Behavior -- ‡tStrategic Behavior Defined -- ‡tNoncooperative Strategic Behavior -- ‡tPredatory Pricing -- ‡tLimit Pricing -- ‡tInvestments to Lower Production Costs -- ‡tRaising Rivals' Costs -- ‡tWelfare Implications and the Role of the Courts -- ‡tCooperative Strategic Behavior -- ‡tPractices That Facilitate Collusion -- ‡tCooperative Strategic Behavior and the Role of the Courts -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tSuggested Readings -- ‡tAppendix 11A: -- ‡tThe Strategic Use of Tie-in Sales and Product Compatibility to Create or Maintain Market Power with Applications to Networks -- ‡tExample 11.1 -- ‡tSupreme Court Says Alleged Predation Must Be Credible -- ‡tExample 11.2 -- ‡tEvidence of Predatory Pricing in Tobacco -- ‡tExample 11.3 -- ‡tThe Shrinking Share of Dominant Firms -- ‡tExample 11.4 -- ‡tAnd Only a Smile Remained -- ‡tExample 11.5 -- ‡tStrategic Behavior and Rapid Technological Change: The Microsoft Case -- ‡tExample 11.6 -- ‡tValue of Preventing Entry -- ‡tExample 11.7 -- ‡tThe FTC Versus Ethyl, et al. -- ‡tExample 11.8 -- ‡tInformation Exchanges: The Hardwood Case -- ‡gChapter 12. -- ‡tVertical Integration and Vertical Restrictions -- ‡tThe Reasons for and Against Vertical Integration -- ‡tIntegration to Lower Transaction Costs -- ‡tIntegration to Assure Supply -- ‡tIntegration to Eliminate Externalities -- ‡tIntegration to Avoid Government Intervention -- ‡tIntegration to Increase Monopoly Profits -- ‡tIntegration to Eliminate Market Power -- ‡tThe Life Cycle of a Firm -- ‡tVertical Restrictions -- ‡tVertical Restrictions Used to Solve Problems in Distribution -- ‡tThe Effects of Vertical Restrictions -- ‡tBanning Vertical Restrictions -- ‡tFranchising -- ‡tEmpirical Evidence -- ‡tEvidence on Vertical Integration -- ‡tEvidence on Vertical Restrictions -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tSuggested Readings -- ‡tExample 12.1 -- ‡tOutsourcing -- ‡tExample 12.2 -- ‡tPreventing Holdups -- ‡tExample 12.3 -- ‡tOwn Your Own Steel Mill -- ‡tExample 12.4 -- ‡tDouble Mark up -- ‡tExample 12.5 -- ‡tBlockbuster's Solution to the Double Manginalization Problem -- ‡tExample 12.6 -- ‡tFree Riding on the Web -- ‡tExample 12.7 -- ‡tBrewing Trouble; Restructing Vertical Integration in Alcoholic Beverage Industries -- ‡gPart 4 -- ‡tInformation Advertising, and Disclosure -- ‡gChapter 13. -- ‡tInformation -- ‡tWhy Information is Limited -- ‡tLimited Information About Quality -- ‡tThe Market for "Lemons" -- ‡tSolving the Problem: Equal Information -- ‡tEvidence on Lemons Markets -- ‡tLimited Information About Price -- ‡tThe Tourist-Trap Model -- ‡t*The Tourists-and-Natives Model -- ‡tProviding Consumer Information Lowers Price -- ‡tHow Information Lowers Prices -- ‡tAn Example: Grocery Store Information Programs -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tSuggested Readings -- ‡tAppendix 13A -- ‡tMarket Shares in the Tourists-and-Natives Model -- ‡tExample 13.1 -- ‡tGenetically Modified Organisons: Do Consumers NOT care or Not Read? -- ‡tExample 13.2 -- ‡tUnderstanding Consumer Information -- ‡tExample 13.3 -- ‡tCounteriest Halal Heat -- ‡tExample 13.4 -- ‡tCertifying Thoaugh Breads -- ‡tExample 13.5 -- ‡tPrice Dispersion and Search Costs in the Talmud -- ‡tExample 13.6 -- ‡tPrice Dispersion -- ‡tExample 13.7 -- ‡tTourist Cemeras -- ‡gChapter 14. -- ‡tAdvertising and Disclosure -- ‡tInformation and Advertising -- ‡tPromotions -- ‡t"Search" Versus "Experience" Goods -- ‡tInformational Versus Persuasive Advertising -- ‡tProfit-Maximizing Advertising -- ‡tEffects of Advertising on Welfare -- ‡tPrice Advertising Increases Welfare -- ‡tAdvertising to Solve the Lemons Problem -- ‡tWhen Advertising Is Excessive -- ‡tFalse Advertising -- ‡tLimits to Lying -- ‡tAntifraud Laws -- ‡tDisclosure Laws -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tSuggested Readings -- ‡tAppendix 14A -- ‡tProfit-Maximizing Advertising -- ‡tExample 14.1 -- ‡tBranding and Labeling -- ‡tExample 14.2 -- ‡tCelebrity Endorsements -- ‡tExample 14.3 -- ‡tMilk Advertising -- ‡tExample 14.4 -- ‡tSocial Gain from Price Advertising: -- ‡tExample 14.5 -- ‡tWelfare Effects of Restricting Alcohol Ads -- ‡tExample 14.6 -- ‡tLet All Who Are Hungry Come and Eat -- ‡gPart 5 -- ‡tDynamic Models and Market Clearing. |
| 505 | 0 | 0 | ‡gChapter 5. -- ‡tCartels -- ‡tWhy Cartels Form -- ‡tCreating and Enforcing the Cartel -- ‡tFactors That Facilitate the Formation of Cartels -- ‡tEnforcing a Cartel Agreement -- ‡tCartels and Price Wars -- ‡tConsumers Gain as Cartels Fail -- ‡tPrice-Fixing Laws -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tSuggested Readings -- ‡tAppendix 5A -- ‡tThe Effects of Cartel Size -- ‡tExample 5.1 -- ‡tAn Electrifying Conspiracy -- ‡tExample 5.2 -- ‡tThe Viability of Commodity Cartels -- ‡tExample 5.3 -- ‡tConcrete Example of Government-Aided Collusion -- ‡tExample 5.4 -- ‡tRelieving the Headache of Running a cartel -- ‡tExample 5.5 -- ‡tVitamins Cartel -- ‡tExample 5.6 -- ‡tHow Consumers Were Railroaded -- ‡tExample 5.7 -- ‡tThe Social Costs of Cartelization -- ‡tExample 5.8 -- ‡tProsecuting Global Cartels -- ‡gChapter 6. -- ‡tOligopoly -- ‡tGame Theory -- ‡tSingle-Period Oligopoly Models -- ‡tNash Equilibrium -- ‡tThe Cournot Model -- ‡tThe Bertrand Model -- ‡tThe Stackelberg Leader-Follower Model -- ‡tA Comparison of the Major Oligopoly Models -- ‡tMultiperiod Games -- ‡tSingle-Period Prisoners' Dilemma Game -- ‡tInfinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Game -- ‡tTypes of Equilibria in Multiperiod Games -- ‡tExperimental Evidence on Oligopoly Models -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tSuggested Readings -- ‡tAppendix 6A -- ‡tA Mathematical Derivation of Cournot and Stackelberg Equilibria -- ‡tAppendix 6B -- ‡tMixed Strategies -- ‡tExample 6.1 -- ‡tDo Birds of a Feather Cournot-Flock Together? -- ‡tExample 6.2 -- ‡tOligopoly Welfare Losses -- ‡tExample 6.3 -- ‡tMergers in a Cournot Economy -- ‡tExample 6.4 -- ‡tRoller Coaster Gasoline -- ‡tExample 6.5 -- ‡tCopying Pricing -- ‡tExample 6.6 -- ‡tCar Wars -- ‡gChapter 7. -- ‡tProduct Differentiation and Monopolistic Competition -- ‡tDifferentiated Products -- ‡tThe Effect of Differentiation on a Firm's Demand Curve -- ‡tPreferences for Characteristics of Products -- ‡tThe Representative Consumer Model -- ‡tA Representative Consumer Model with Undifferentiated Products -- ‡tA Representative Consumer Model with Differentiated Products -- ‡tConclusions about Representative Consumer Models -- ‡tLocation Models -- ‡tHotelling's Location Model -- ‡tSalop's Circle Model -- ‡tHybrid Models -- ‡tEstimation of Differentiated Goods Models -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tSuggested Readings -- ‡tAppendix 7A -- ‡tWelfare in a Monopolistic Competition Model with Homogeneous Products -- ‡tAppendix 7B -- ‡tWelfare in a Monopolistic Competition Model with Differentiated Products -- ‡tExample 7.1 -- ‡tAll Water Is Not the Same -- ‡tExample 7.2 -- ‡tEntry Lowers Prices -- ‡tExample 7.3 -- ‡tThe Jeans Market -- ‡tExample 7.4 -- ‡tA Serial Problem -- ‡tExample 7.5 -- ‡tCombining Beers -- ‡gChapter 8. -- ‡tIndustry Structure and Performance -- ‡tTheories of Price Markups and Profits -- ‡tStructure-Conduct-Performance -- ‡tMeasures of Market Performance -- ‡tRates of Return -- ‡tPrice-Cost Margins -- ‡tMeasures of Market Structure -- ‡tThe Relationship of Structure to Performance -- ‡tModern Structure-Conduct-Performance Analysis -- ‡tTheory -- ‡tEmpirical Research -- ‡tValue of Modern Approaches to measuring Performance -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tAppendix 8A -- ‡tRelationship Between the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Price-Cost Margin -- ‡tAppendix 8B -- ‡tIdentifying Market Power -- ‡tExample 8.1 -- ‡tSupermarkets and Concentration -- ‡tExample 8.2 -- ‡tHow Sweet It Is -- ‡gPart 3 -- ‡tBusiness Practices: Strategies and Conduct -- ‡gChapter 9. -- ‡tPrice Discrimination -- ‡tNonuniform Pricing -- ‡tIncentive and Conditions for Price Discrimination -- ‡tProfit Motive for Price Discrimination -- ‡tConditions for Price Discrimination -- ‡tResales -- ‡tTypes of Price Discrimination -- ‡tPerfect Price Discrimination -- ‡tDifferent Prices to Different Groups -- ‡tOther Methods of Third-Degree Price Discrimination -- ‡tWelfare Effects of Price Discrimination -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tSuggested Readings -- ‡tAppendix 9A -- ‡tAn Example of Price Discrimination: Agricultural Marketing Orders -- ‡tExample 9.1 -- ‡tCoupons -- ‡tExample 9.2 -- ‡tThank You, Doctor -- ‡tExample 9.3 -- ‡tHalting Drug Sales from Canada -- ‡tExample 9.4 -- ‡tVertical Integration as a Means of Price Discrimination: Alcoa Shows Its True Metal -- ‡tExample 9.5 -- ‡tA Discriminating Labor Union -- ‡tExample 9.6 -- ‡tDoes Competition Always Lower Price? |
| 505 | 0 | 0 | ‡gPart 1 -- ‡tIntroduction and theory 1 -- ‡gChapter 1. -- ‡tOverview -- ‡tmodels -- ‡tPrice Theory -- ‡tTransaction Costs -- ‡tGame Theory -- ‡tContestable Markets -- ‡tOrganization -- ‡tBasic Theory -- ‡tMarket Structures -- ‡tBusiness Practices: Strategies and Conduct -- ‡tInformation, Advertising, and Disclosure -- ‡tDynamic Models and Market Clearing -- ‡tGovernment Policies and Their Effects -- ‡gChapter 2. -- ‡tThe Firm and Costs -- ‡tThe Firm -- ‡tThe Objective of a Firm -- ‡tOwnership and Control -- ‡tMergers and Acquisitions -- ‡tReasons for Mergers and Acquisitions -- ‡tMerger Activity in the United States -- ‡tMerger Activities in Other Countries -- ‡tEmpirical Evidence on the Efficiency and Profitability of Mergers -- ‡tCost Concepts -- ‡tTypes of Costs -- ‡tCost Concepts -- ‡tEconomies of Scale -- ‡tReasons for Economies of Scale -- ‡tTotal Costs Determine Scale Economies -- ‡tA Measure of Scale Economies -- ‡tEmpirical Studies of Cost Curves -- ‡tEconomies of Scale in Total Manufacturing Costs -- ‡tSurvivorship Studies -- ‡tCost Concepts for Multiproduct Firms -- ‡tAdaptation of Traditional Cost Concepts for a Multiproduct Firm -- ‡tEconomies of Scope -- ‡tEconomies of Scale and Economies of Scope -- ‡tSpecialization in Manufacturing -- ‡tAn Example of an Industry with Economies of Scope -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tSuggested Readings -- ‡tAppendix 2A -- ‡tCost Concepts for a Multiproduct Firm -- ‡tExample 2.1 -- ‡tValue of Limited Liability -- ‡tExample 2.2 -- ‡tConflicts of Interest Between Managers and share holders -- ‡tExample 2.3 -- ‡tSpecialization of Labor -- ‡tExample 2.4 -- ‡tIndiana Libraries -- ‡tExample 2.5 -- ‡tThe Baking Industry -- ‡tExample 2.6 -- ‡tElectricity Minimum Efficient Scale and Scope -- ‡gPart 2 -- ‡tMarket Structures -- ‡gChapter 3. -- ‡tCompetition -- ‡tPerfect Competition -- ‡tAssumptions -- ‡tThe Behavior of a Single Firm -- ‡tThe Competitive Market -- ‡tElasticities and The Residual Demand Curve -- ‡tElasticities of Demand and Supply -- ‡tThe Residual Demand Curve of Price Takers -- ‡tEfficiency and Welfare -- ‡tEfficiency -- ‡tWelfare -- ‡tEntry and Exit -- ‡tRestrictions On Entry -- ‡tCompetition with Few Firms-Contestability -- ‡tDefinition of Barriers to Entry -- ‡tIdentifying Barriers to Entry -- ‡tThe Size of Entry Barriers by Industry -- ‡tExternalities -- ‡tLimitations of Perfect Competition -- ‡tThe Many Meanings of Competition -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tExample 3.1 -- ‡tAre Farmers Price Takers? -- ‡tExample 3.2 -- ‡tRestrictions on Entry Across Countries -- ‡tExample 3.3 -- ‡tFTC Opposes Internet Bans That Harm Competition -- ‡tExample 3.4 -- ‡tIncreasing Congestion -- ‡gChapter 4. -- ‡tMonopolies, Monopsonies, and Dominant Firms -- ‡tMonopoly Behavior -- ‡tProfit Maximization -- ‡tMonopoly Power -- ‡tThe Incentive for Efficient Operation -- ‡tMonopoly Behavior over Time -- ‡tThe Costs and Benefits of Monopoly -- ‡tThe Deadweight Loss of Monopoly -- ‡tRent-Seeking Behavior -- ‡tMonopoly Profits and Deadweight Loss Vary with the Elasticity of Demand -- ‡tThe Benefits of Monopoly -- ‡tCreating and Maintaining a Monopoly -- ‡tKnowledge Advantage -- ‡tGovernment-Created Monopolies -- ‡tNatural Monopoly -- ‡tProfits and Monopoly -- ‡tIs Any Firm That Earns a Positive Profit a Monopoly? -- ‡tDoes a Monopoly Always Earn a Positive Profit? -- ‡tAre Monopoly Mergers to Eliminate Short-Run Losses Desirable? -- ‡tMonopsony -- ‡tDominant Firm with a Competitive Fringe -- ‡tWhy Some Firms Are Dominant -- ‡tThe No-Entry Model -- ‡tA Model with Free, Instantaneous Entry -- ‡tSummary -- ‡tProblems -- ‡tSuggested Readings -- ‡tExample 4.1 -- ‡tMonopoly Newspaper Ad Prices -- ‡tExample 4.2 -- ‡tMonopolizing by Merging -- ‡tExample 4.3 -- ‡tControlling a key Ingredient -- ‡tExample 4.4 -- ‡tPreventing Imitation-Cat Got Your Tongue? -- ‡tExample 4.5 -- ‡tProtecting a Monopoly -- ‡tExample 4.6 -- ‡tEu Allows merger to Eliminate Losses -- ‡tExample 4.7 -- ‡tPriest Monopsony -- ‡tExample 4.8 -- ‡tPrice Umbrella -- ‡tExample 4.9 -- ‡tChina Tobacco Monopoly to Become a Dominant Firm. |
| 520 | ⊔ | ⊔ | ‡aProblems -- Suggested Readings -- Appendix 9A -- An Example of Price Discrimination: Agricultural Marketing Orders -- Example 9.1 -- Coupons -- Example 9.2 -- Thank You, Doctor -- Example 9.3 -- Halting Drug Sales from Canada -- Example 9.4 -- Vertical Integration as a Means of Price Discrimination: Alcoa Shows Its True Metal -- Example 9.5 -- A Discriminating Labor Union -- Example 9.6 -- Does Competition Always Lower Price? |
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| CAT | ⊔ | ⊔ | ‡aSDR-UCBK ‡dALMA ‡lprepare.pl-004-008 |
| FMT | ⊔ | ⊔ | ‡aBK |
| HOL | ⊔ | ⊔ | ‡0sdr-ucbk.991040088839706532 ‡aucbk ‡bSDR ‡cUCBK ‡pucbk.ark:/28722/h24x54x86 ‡sUC ‡1991040088839706532 |
| 974 | ⊔ | ⊔ | ‡bUC ‡cUCBK ‡d20220503 ‡sberkeley ‡uucbk.ark:/28722/h24x54x86 ‡y2005 ‡ric ‡qbib ‡tUS bib date1 >= 1929 |