Why do firms invest in general training? :
'good' firms and 'bad' firms as a source of monopsony power /
Alison L. Booth and gylfi Zoega.

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Main Author: Booth, Alison L.
Related Names: Gylfi Zoega.
Language(s): English
Published: London : Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2000.
Subjects: Skilled labor > Skilled labor / Great Britain.
Monopsonies > Monopsonies / Great Britain.
Labor productivity > Labor productivity / Great Britain.
Employees > Employees / Training of > Employees / Training of / Great Britain.
Physical Description: 32 p. ; 21 cm.
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Limited (search only) no.2536	University of Virginia

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