Why legal restrictions on private contracts can enhance efficiency /
Philippe Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin.

Description

Tools

Cite this Export citation file

Main Author: Aghion, Philippe.
Related Names: Hermalin, Benjamin E.
Language(s): English
Published: Berkeley, Calif. : University of California at Berkeley, Dept. of Economics, [1990]
Subjects: Contracts > Contracts / Mathematical models.
Note: "April 1990."
Also available online
Physical Description: 37 p. ; 28 cm.
Locate a Print Version: Find in a library

Viewability

Item Link	Original Source
Limited (search only)	University of California

View HathiTrust MARC record

Similar Items

The effects of competition on executive behavior

Author: Hermalin, Benjamin E.
Published: 1991

Adverse selection, short-term contracting, and the underprovision of on-the-job training

Author: Hermalin, Benjamin E.
Published: 1990

Heterogeneity in organizational form : why otherwise identical firms choose different incentives for their managers

Author: Hermalin, Benjamin E.
Published: 1992

The effects of competitive pressures on executive behavior

Author: Hermalin, Benjamin E.
Published: 1990

Managerial preferences concerning risky projects

Author: Hermalin, Benjamin E.
Published: 1991

The use of an agent in a signalling model

Author: Caillaud, Bernard.
Published: 1991

Competition and growth : reconciling theory and evidence

Author: Aghion, Philippe.
Published: 2005

A model of market enhancing infrastructure

Author: Aghion, Philippe.
Published: 2000

The determinants of efficiency and solvency in savings and loans

Author: Hermalin, Benjamin E.
Published: 1992

Corporate diversification and agency

Author: Hermalin, Benjamin E.
Published: 1994