Heterogeneity in organizational form : why otherwise identical firms choose different incentives for their managers

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090 ‡aHB1 ‡b.W68 no.193
035 ‡a(OCoLC)30554803
100 1 ‡aHermalin, Benjamin E.
245 1 0 ‡aHeterogeneity in organizational form : ‡bwhy otherwise identical firms choose different incentives for their managers / ‡cBenjamin E. Hermalin.
260 ‡aBerkeley, Calif. : ‡bUniversity of California at Berkeley, Dept. of Economics, ‡c[1992]
300 ‡a35 p. ; ‡c28 cm.
490 0 ‡aWorking paper ; ‡vno. 92-193
500 ‡a"May 1992."
504 ‡aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 34-35).
530 ‡aAlso available online
538 ‡aMode of access: Internet.
650 0 ‡aIncentives in industry ‡xEconometric models.
650 0 ‡aExecutives ‡xSalaries, etc. ‡xEconometric models.
776 0 ‡iOnline version: ‡aHermalin, Benjamin E. ‡tHeterogeneity in organizational form. ‡dBerkeley, Calif. : University of California at Berkeley, Dept. of Economics, [1992] ‡h1 online resource (35 p.) ‡w(OCoLC)906531092
CID ‡a101691075
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DAT 1 ‡a20181107125011.0 ‡b2018-11-07T20:51:14Z
DAT 2 ‡a2016-07-25T18:00:02Z
CAT ‡aSDR-UCBK ‡dIII - MILLENIUM ‡lprepare.pl-004-007
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