Bargaining structure, fairness and efficiency /
Matthew Rabin.

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Main Author: Rabin, Matt.
Related Names: University of California, Berkeley. Institute of Business and Economic Research.
University of California, Berkeley. Department of Economics.
Language(s): English
Published: Berkeley : University of California at Berkeley, Dept. of Economics, [2000]
Subjects: Negotiation > Negotiation / Mathematical models.
Note: "February 1997. Re-issued July 2000."
At head of title: University of California at Berkeley, Department of Economics.
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Physical Description: 18 leaves : ill. ; 28 cm.
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