Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition /
prepared by Tito Cordella and Eduardo Levy Yeyati

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Main Author: Cordella, Tito
Related Names: Levy Yeyati, Eduardo
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Exchange Affairs Dept
Language(s): English
Published: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Dept., c1998
Subjects: Risk assessment
Competition
Deposit insurance
Banks and banking
Physical Description: 45 p. : ill. ; 28 cm
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