Escalation and intrawar deterrence during limited wars in the Middle East /
W. Andrew Terrill.

Description

Main Author

Terrill, W. Andrew.

Related Names

Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute.

Language(s)

English

Published

Carlisle, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009.

Subjects

Persian Gulf War, 1991.
Arab-Israeli conflict > Arab-Israeli conflict / 1967-1973.
Deterrence (Strategy) > Deterrence (Strategy) / Case studies.
Escalation (Military science) > Escalation (Military science) / Case studies.

Summary

This monograph analyzes military escalation and intrawar deterrence by examining two key wars where these concepts became especially relevant: the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. A central conclusion of this monograph is that intrawar deterrence is an inherently fragile concept, and that the nonuse of weapons of mass destruction in both wars was the result of a number of positive factors that may not be repeated in future conflicts.

Note

"September 2009."
Also available online in PDF format from Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required.

Physical Description

xiii, 112 p. ; 23 cm

ISBN

1584874066
9781584874065

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